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HOMOSEXUALITY AND
NULLITY-DEVELOPING
JURISPRUDENCE
REV. MSGR. WALTER F. KENNY*
C ERTAINLY, one of the most tragic marital situations brought before
the ecclesiastical Tribunal is a case in which one partner is a homo-
sexual. The difficulty, as you well know, has been that there was not an
adequate jurisprudence to deal with this emotional disorder. However,
there have been recent decisions which show a developing understanding
of homosexuality and provide a basis which will enable marriages in-
volving serious homosexuals to be annulled on the basis of homosexual-
ity alone.
There are two possible bases for annulling a marriage wherein it
is alleged one party suffers from mental illness. One is that his consent
is deficient because he is unable to place the acts of intellect and will,
necessary for the critical judgment to bring consent to a serious on-going
contract, such as marriage, into being. The result is a lack of a naturally
sufficient matrimonial consent (consensus matrimonialis naturaliter suffi-
ciens inexistens). The other possibility is that because of mental illness
the victim is fundamentally an unfit subject to undertake, fulfill and
receive marital rights and obligations. Since he cannot fulfill the contract
even if he were able to have sufficient judgment to give consent to the
contract, the contract would not exist, since the object cannot be brought
into being by him. In this case there would be a contractus matrimonialis
inexistens.1
* M.A., Dunwoodie, 1954; S.T.L., Gregorian, Rome, 1956; S.T.D., Gregorian,
1957; M.S., lona College, 1956. Defender of Bond. Pro-Synodal Judge.
1 Cf. W.J. TOBIN, A CANONICAL EVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF HOMO-
SEXUALITY TO THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE IN THE LIGHT OF RECULT ROTAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE 155 (1964).
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Basically, there are three kinds of clin-
ical manifestations of emotional illness.
One type of emotional illness is expressed
in psychological symptoms, i.e., in a think-
ing disorder. Schizophrenia is one such
disorder in which thinking and emotion are
divided. A second type of emotional illness
manifests itself in physiological symptoms,
e.g., psychologically caused impotence. A
third type of emotional disorder finds its
expression primarily in maladjustment of
social behavior. These are called socio-
pathic personality disorders.2 Homosexual-
ity per se belongs in this last category. It
is a behavior disorder manifesting itself in
compulsive, repetitive, non-gratifying, es-
sentially unsocialized sexual conduct.
Hence, it is evident that the basis of the
inability to fulfill the contract is the one
that fits the diagnosic category of homo-
sexuality, rather than that of a lack of
discretion. The recent Rotal decisions have
lately moved in this direction and are tak-
ing into account, therefore, the reality of
the homosexual disorder.
There are four Rotal decisions we wish
to discuss to illustrate aspects of this grow-
ing jurisprudence. Two of these deal with
sociopaths, who are not homosexuals, and
two of them deal with marriages in which
one party is a homosexual. The first case
was brought before the Tribunal of Bos-
ton on the grounds of insanity. The man
in this case was a forger of checks and a
borrower of money from his friends with-
out repayment, a liar and a megalomaniac.
The marriage lasted one month, after
which time the woman could no longer put
2 Cf. NOYES & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSY-
CHIATRY 546 (5th ed. 1960).
up with his financial irresponsibility. The
Court of Boston denied the nullity, and the
case was appealed directly to the Rota.
The first Turna of the Rota, under Father
Rogers, gave an affirmative decision. In the
law section of this decision we read: "Be-
cause of the fact that someone seems to
enjoy sufficient use of reason, he is not
necessarily responsible for all the conse-
quences of his actions, because it could
happen by reason of some psychiatric dis-
order, he may not be capable of the obli-
gations of which he has only a notional
knowledge."
The Court goes on to say that many
dementes know what marriage is and wish
to become part of it, but some of them are
incapable of exchanging the perpetual and
exclusive right to each other's body for
the purpose of performing acts suitable
for the generation of children. "In these
cases, we must by all means think of a lack
of consent which arises not from an out-
side force or insufficient reflection, but
from an insufficient determination of the
will or incapacity of assuming obligations
and responsibilities that arise from the
nature of the marriage contract, so much,
that these can not be absolutely separated
from it." The problem is that, in practice
it is very difficult to determine such in-
capacity. Each case of a sociopathic per-
sonality must be investigated individually.
The Court annulled the marriage, stating
that the defendant was unable to contract
a true marriage, not because he was lack-
ing the use of reason, but because he was
incapable of determining for himself
freely in assuming these responsibilities,
and because of a psychopathic character.
The case was then brought to the Court
of third instance, the Rota, before Father
Bejan, and a decision was reached in
1969. This Turna of the Court accepted
what the Court of second instance said
about the critical faculty necessary for
marriage. However, it maintained with Van
der Veldt and Odenwald, in Psychiatry and
Catholicism, that the freedom of the will
and the ability to act responsibly is not
taken away in the case of a sociopath. The
sociopath may not be responsible for cer-
tain types of action, which are directly
connected with his mental syndrome. This
Turna, therefore, maintains that it is not
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
sociopathic disorder, but it is necessary to
prove the connection between the person's
mental disorder and the marriage. Other
marriages of sociopaths have been annulled
because the symptoms were directly re-
lated to marriage, but in this case the
Fathers of the Rota state that the records
and facts do not sufficiently demonstrate
that the defendant lacked the critical fac-
ulty and will of self-determination in re-
gard to his marriage. He was financially
irresponsible, but this was not directly re-
lated to his marriage. As far as marriage
is concerned, the defendant seemed to be
capable of a human act, in entering the
contract, and not impelled toward getting
married by an internal force. He had suf-
ficient knowledge and freedom of choice.
One must not conclude that a psycho-
pathic personality is totally unable to elicit
a human act about everything. In regard
to marriage, he did not seem to be so
afflicted.
The reports of the experts, according
to this decision, presume what they are
supposed to prove, i.e., within the range of
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matrimonial matters the defendant lacked
due internal freedom. Hence, the Rota held
for the validity of the marriage.
From this decision it is evident that a
sociopath is able to form a naturally suf-
ficient consent. Not all sociopaths are de-
ficient regarding marriage.
The second case concerns a male psy-
chopath whose case was initiated in New
York. There were two grounds presented
for this case, the lack of discretion and an
intention contra bonum prolis. The court-
ship of this couple lasted for some five
years, but was very erratic on the part of
the man. The main reason why the re-
spondent refused marriage during all that
time was because he did not want children.
Although his confession was not perfect,
he had revealed before the marriage that
he could not stand the responsibility of
children. He married the girl impulsively
only because he thought she was pregnant.
After the marriage there were no sexual
relations, since he showed an aversion,
and ten days after the marriage he broke
down weeping, stating that he couldn't
stand marriage and didn't want children.
The wife left him after one month.
The Tribunal in New York decided neg-
atively regarding discretion, but affirmed
the annulment on the grounds of the in-
tention contra bonum prolis. The case was
duly appealed to Philadelphia, which pro-
duced a negative decision on both counts.
The case was then appealed to the Rota,
Coram Fagiolo, and a decision given the
23rd of January, 1970.
It is obvious that the only case that
the Rota could consider was the intention
contra bonum prolis, since the lack of
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discretion had two negative decisions al-
ready. The Rota found for the annulment
on the grounds that the intention contra
bonum prolis was caused by the psycho-
pathic personality of the respondent. "The
defendant could not have entered a valid
marriage because of some moral impo-
tence, as they call it today. He was not
against having children because of bad
will, but because he was incapable of as-
suming the marriage obligations."
The Rota refers to the fact that some
are trying to get an impediment of moral
impotence into the code. However,
"[w]hatever opinion one may hold about
the new code, one must not dispute the
fact that whoever is incapable of assuming
the marriage obligations becomes auto-
matically incapable of entering the mar-
riage contract."'3 In fact, the code contem-
plates this principle, although not in the
form some would suggest. In the code,
marriage is effected by the consent of the
parties expressed between persons who are
capable according to law, Canon 1081, 1.
This capability, in fact, does not originate
only from the positive law, but primarily
from the law of nature itself. Those are
certainly incapable who cannot under-
stand, accept or exchange the right to each
other's body, which by nature the genera-
tion of children calls for, and which we
call marriage (Canon 1081, 1082).
Therefore, those that are not capable of
eliciting a free consent or do not under-
stand the nature of marriage, or are in-
capable of assuming the essential obliga-
3 "qui incapax est assumendi onera essentialia
matrimonii, incapacem quoque esse matrimonii
ineundi, ex ipsa naturali ordinatione."
tions of marriage, are not contracting a
valid marriage. This incapacity, however,
can originate from a few causes: amentia,
pathological and psychological distur-
bances that affect sexual ability, e.g.,
nymphomania, satyriasis, homosexuality,
sadism, masochism, etc. Among the defects
of consent one can duly include all kinds
of incapacity to assume the essential mar-
riage obligations. "He, who is incapable of
assuming such obligations, is not capable
of eliciting an act of the will whereby each
party exchanges and accepts the rights
and duties inherent to marriage."'4
According to Fagiolo, the code does not
make any mention of the incapacity of as-
suming the rights and essential obligations
of marriage, although the code implies that
anyone who suffers from such an incapac-
ity cannot validly marry. Perhaps, says
Fagiolo, the Code in the future should
make more explicit these incapacities.
However, he does not feel that moral im-
potence should be one of them, since it
4 "Ideo qui habiles non sint vel incapaces emit-
tendi consensum liberum quo intelligitur quid
secumferat sitque essentialiter coniugium vel
non sint capaces assumendi essentialia matri-
monii onera, valide hi non contrahunt. Haec
vero incapacitas provenire potest ex pluribus
causis: ex amentia, ex perturbatione patho-
logica quae sphaeram psychicam respicit et
in sexualem quoque influit quandoque uti
accidit v.gr. in casu nymphomaniae vel
satyriasis, omosexualitatis, sadismi, maso-
chismi, etc.-Omnes insuper personalitatis
anomaliae, quae grave inferunt damnum in-
tellectui vel voluntati, causam constituere
possunt defectus debiti validique consensus
matrimonialis. Quin igitur expectetur nova et
explicita Codicis statuitio, iam ex principiis
traditis et ex iurisprudentia scimus omnes mor-
bos habituales mentis eiusque perturbationes
departs from the traditional use of the
term.
In this case, in examining the proofs re-
garding the exclusion of children, the Rota
did not consider merely the statements re-
garding children made by the respondent,
but also the proofs alleged for the basis-
the presence of mental disorder-because
one set of proofs enlightens the other.
"Justice demands that due consideration
be given to all the arguments concerning
the end purpose of the case, i.e., the nul-
lity of marriage, if it is examined and ana-
lyzed, although some of the arguments are
not strictly pertinent to the cause of nullity
for which this case is being discussed and
adjudicated."
The Court found for nullity in this case,
but the conclusions that we can draw from
this case are simply this: while, in general,
lack of discretion of judgment would be in-
compatible with making an intention con-
tra bonum prolis, i.e., if one is capable of
such an intention against a bona of mar-
riage, he should be capable of marrying
and, hence, he does not lack discretion.
However, the inability to assume the obli-
gations of marriage is compatible with an
actuales gignere posse graves rationis usus
defectus, qui referri possunt ad defectus con-
sensus vel ad defectus discretionis iudicii. Ideo
iam vi canonum 1081 et 1082 propositae
quaestiones solvi possunt. Et inter defectus
consensus rite includi possunt omnes species
incapacitatis assumendi onera essentialia ma-
trimonii. Qui enim incapax est huiusmodi
assumendi onera vel non percipit obiectum
circa quod vertitur matrimonialis consensus
vel eius consensus non est personae habilis
seu capacis emittendi actum voluntatis quo
utraque pars tradit et acceptat iura et officia
propria matrimonio."
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intention contrary to one of the bona of
marriage. Some people, because of their
defects, sexual or otherwise, are incapable
of assuming the obligations of marriage.
They cannot consent to marriage precisely
because of this incapacity to the object,
which has little to do with eliciting of con-
sent at the time of the marriage, nor with
their discretionary powers at that time.
They rather suffer from a generalized in-
capacity to assume the obligations of mar-
riage.
The third case is that of a female homo-
sexual from Montreal. The basis of this
case is her homosexuality alone. This
woman suffered a difficult childhood as an
adopted child. She participated in homo-
sexual acts from her adolescence until six
months after the marriage. At the time of
the marriage, however, she intended the
marital state, together with fidelity, per-
manence, and children. For a period of
four years after the marriage, she success-
fully avoided homosexual encounters.
However, the chance meeting with a les-
bian reactivated her homosexual inclina-
tion. She again began to act homosexually
and the marriage ended after ten years,
when the husband discovered her vice.
Three children, however, had been born
of the marriage and the woman had always
been capable of relations, and complained
of her husband's lack of affection for her.
The Montreal Court of first instance found
that the nullity of the marriage was proven
by reason of the homosexuality of the
wife, which rendered her incapable of as-
suming both the essential obligations of
marriage and the very nature of marriage,
itself. The Court of second instance, i.e.,
the Appeal Court of Montreal, found for
the validity of the marriage and pointed
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out that the respondent was able to live in
the marriage, and that the separation oc-
curred only because the husband dis-
covered her vice and felt it was incurable.
The case was appealed to the Rota, and a
decision was given Coram Anne on the
25th of February, 1969. In the law section
of this decision, the Court quotes, first of
all, Canon 1081, and then a section from
Gaudium et Spes, Chapter 48, of the Vati-
can Council: "The intimate partnership of
married life and love has been established
by the Creator and qualified by His laws.
It is rooted in the conjugal covenant of ir-
revocable personal consent. Hence, by that
human act whereby spouses mutually be-
stow and accept each other, a relationship
arises which by divine will and in the eyes
of society, too, is a lasting one. For the
good of the spouses and their offspring as
well as of society, the existence of this
sacred bond no longer depends on human
decisions alone."
5
The Rota goes on to state that Canon
1081 covers all defects of marriage con-
sent. First of all, it includes those cases
where there is a defect of the quality of
consent, i.e., a lack of discretion of judg-
ment of the will. Secondly, it also includes
a defect of the formal object of the con-
sent, i.e., that by which the consent be-
5 "Intima communitas vitae et amoris coniugalis
a Creatore condita suisque legibus instructa,
foedere coniugii seu irrevocabili consensu per-
sonali instauratur. Ita actu humano, quo
coniuges sese mutuo tradunt at que accipiunt,
institutum ordinatione divina firmum oritur,
etiam coram societate; hoc vinculum sacrum
intuitu boni turn coniugum et prolis turn so-
cietatis non ex humano arbitrio pendet. Ipse
vero Deus est auctor matrimonii, variis bonis
ac finibus praediti"
comes marital. This defect of the formal
object occurs because the contractant is
unable, and incurably so, of giving and re-
ceiving the object of the marriage consent,
itself. This defect of the formal object is
not an exclusion of the object of the con-
tract such as in Canon 1086, par. 2, but it
is a defect of the object of the contract
when the one getting married is unable to
give that by which the consent becomes
really marriage. 6 No one, says the Rota,
is able to contract for that which he is
unable to deliver. No one can be held
bound to the morally impossible. If one is
such a prey to ever lively sexual desires
from some morbid condition that he can-
not resist these desires, it must be said that
he lacks the capacity for marital consent
by not being able to promise that which is
not in his power.
The question is how and whether a
homosexual is to be considered incapable
of contracting the marriage bond so that at
least in some cases the vice of homo-
sexuality might be considered per se caput
nullitatis matrimonii.7 (Marriages of homo-
6 Etenim, praeter casus in quibus nupturientis
consensus irritus dicendus est sive ob exclusionem
vinculi matrimonialis vel essentialis eiusdem ali-
cuius proprietatis sive ob contrahentis defectum
aut discretionis sufficientis iudicii aut liberi ar-
bitrii, fieri potest ut consensus matrimonialis
invalidus set OB DEFECTUM OBIECTI FOR-
MALLS, quo fit ut consensus sit vere matri-
monialis. Nam contingere potest ut contrahens
sit inhabilis, idque insanabiliter, ad tradendum
acceptandumque ipsius consensus obiectum.
Tunc non adest exclusio obiecti, uti in can. 1086,
par. 2, sed defectus obiecti, cum nupturiens in-
capax sit tradere id quo consensus fit nuptialis.
7 11)-Perpensis hisce synthematibus vitii
homosexualitatis tali gravissima in conditione vi-
gentis, quae, omni ambivalentia sexuali exclusa,
sexuals, of course, have been annulled on
other grounds.) In order to clarify the
possibility of homosexuality as per se caput
nullitatis, the Rota here takes the most
extreme form of homosexuality as an ex-
ample. The most extreme form of homo-
sexuality is a truly inverse monosexual
condition that excludes all sexual ambiv-
alence, i.e., a man bound entirely to his
own sex and truly adverse to the opposite
sex. How can this ultimate homosexual
condition truly be an autonomous caput
nullitatis, and this because of an exclusion
of the formal object of the consent to mar-
riage? The Rota notes, first of all, that un-
less there is a concomitant grave neurosis
or psychosis, the homosexual ordinarily
cannot be said to lack either discretion
or freedom. Some homosexuals, further-
more, by an extreme act of the will, and
with homosexual fantasies, are capable at
times of heterosexual relations, but even
that ability to have relations does not
mean that they are capable of giving and
receiving the ius in corpus which by nat-
ural law is required that the consent be
truly matrimonial. Hence for Anne the
Rotal insanity circa rem uxoriam seems to
be rather the incapacity of assuming the
obligations and of fulfilling them, rather
than the incapacity of choosing, with suffi-
cient discretion of judgment and internal
freedom, the conjugal state.
existimanda est conditio nionosexualis vere in-
versa-qua homo tantum ad eundem sui sexum
allectus est at que ab altero sexu vere aversus-
necessario exsurgit quaestio utrum necne talis
homosexualitatis conditio, quae, peritorium ju-
dicio, insanabilis iam tempore nuptiarum exsti-
terit, constituat caput vere autonomum nullitatis
matrimonii OB DEFECTUM OBIECTI FOR-
MALIS consensus matrimonialis.
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What is the formal object of matrimonial
consent? Canon 1081, par. 2, expresses
only that which is specific to marriage. It
does not indicate the whole substantial
formal object of marital consent. When the
words, perpetual and exclusive, are used,
they do not refer only to the biological and
physiological aspect of marriage. The
formal object of marriage is much broader.
It is the intimate partnership of married
life and love mentioned above in Gaudium
et Spes. It means the common life, the per-
fecting of each other by the parties, the
spiritual union, the two becoming one, the
perfect giving of themselves to each other,
the mutual perfecting of their personalities.
The formal substantial object of marriage,
therefore, is not only the ius in corpus that
is perpetual and exclusive for the purpose
of acts for the procreation of children, ex-
cluding every other formal element, but
comprises even the ius ad vitae consortium
or communitatem vitae which is properly
called matrimonial with its correlative obli-
gations or the right to the intimate union
of persons and works by which they per-
fect one another so that they unite with
God in procreating and educating new
living persons (Humanae vitae),8
8 Obiectum, exinde, formale substantiale istius
consensus est non tantum ius in corpus, per-
petuum et exclusivum, in ordine ad actus per
se aptos ad prolis generationem, excluso omni
alio elemento formali essentiali, sed complecti-
tur etiam ius ad vitae consortium seu commu-
nitatem vitae quae proprie dicitur matrimonialis,
necnon correlativas obligationes, seu ius ad "in-
tirnam personarum at que operunz coniunc-
tionein," qua "se invicem perficiunt ut ad
novorum viventium procreationem et educa-
tionrem cum Deo operam sociant" (Enc. "Hu-
manae vitae").
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Now, it is difficult to explain in a jurid-
ical sense accurately and exhaustively
what is essential to this community of life
and what is merely a perfecting virtue of
it. One must look first to the law of nature
by which God established marriage for
clues to the essential characteristics of the
community of life and then to the realistic
human civilization in which we are living.
However, in reality, it is extremely difficult
to reduce these positive elements in mar-
riage to a list of essentials.
It is easier to demonstrate that this
particular person is deprived of those ele-
ments without which no one could estab-
lish the community of life in the existential
order. Looking at the reality of an indi-
vidual case, the respondent may be so
afflicted that it can be demonstrated that
the formal object of marriage, this com-
mon life, could in no way be brought
about by him. In its principles the common
life is lacking in him. 9
After broadening the base, the Rota
then narrows the possibilities. The formal
object can be said to be lacking for the
above reason only in two cases: a serious
perversion of the sexual instinct such as
homosexuality, which truly extinguishes
the natural activtity of the heterosexual
9 Longe facilius, autem est-cum in causis di-
judicandis iudices ponantur in campo existentiali
-demonstrare, in casu singulari, ob alterutrius
contrahentium conditionem penitus depravatem,
in isto, iam tempore nuptiarum, plane et insana-
biliter ea deficere elementa, sine quibus nemo
exaedificare valeat quodcumque onnis vitae con-
sortium quod sit matrinoniale. Tunc deficit ip-
sum vitae consortium IN SUIS PRINCIPIIS et
hoc in casu deest ipsum obiectum consensus
matrimonialis.
instinct, or a grave personality defect or
affect, such as a paranoia or the equivalent.
Other conditions by which one would be
inclined to think after the marriage that
this respondent did not have it in him to
make this community, can be known only
to God, who alone reads hearts.
The homosexual truly afflicted deeply
may be said to be unable to set up that
community of life which we call marriage,
and, therefore, his marriage is null by de-
fect of the formal object. Despite saying
all this, the Rota found that this marriage
was valid because the woman was capable
of living in a married life, had three chil-
dren, did not deny her husband marital
relations, and could have been cured with
a little bit of charity on the part of her
husband. At the time of the marriage, the
woman definitely had the capacity for
married life, as she proved the first four
years of marriage, and it is not proven
from the acts that she was incapable of
assuming the obligations of marriage.
The fourth case appeared in the Monitor
Ecclesiasticus,0 as a sentence given on the
2nd of December, 1967, Coram Lefebvre,
in the Rota, in first instance. This was the
case of a male homosexual physician in his
forties, who married a female philosophy
professor in her twenties. The man had
been addicted from his youth with homo-
sexual vice, but had a crisis of conscience
between 1954 and 1957, from which he
felt that he was able to overcome his prob-
lem, and so married on the 28th of De-
cember 1963. Their short-lived union was
very unhappy, as the husband was unable
10 Vol. XCIII, III, at 467 et seq. (1968).
to participate in relations very much,
sought to be away from his wife and close
to his male young friends, and to live in
separate rooms. Three months after the
marriage, he was arrested for sexual ac-
tivity with fourteen youths under fifteen
years of age, beginning in 1961, and last-
ing through the marriage. He was sen-
tenced to five years in jail. The basis of
the case brought to the Rota was insanity
circa rem uxoriam. In the law, the Rota
found there were two aspects of this basis
of amentia for the annulment of this mar-
riage; one was the defect of discretion of
judgment, and the second was the incapac-
ity of assuming conjugal obligations."
Regarding the defect of discretion, Le-
febvre maintains that homosexuality im-
plies various conditions that can affect the
consent to marriage in different ways. Ho-
mosexuality consists of an abnormal sexual
instinct, which in a sufficient depth is
directly opposite to the essence and prop-
erties of marriage, opposing both procrea-
tion and faithfulness. In the Rotal juris-
prudence, a critical faculty is necessary
in order to marry validly i.e., the ability to
judge, which implies the ordination and
the coordination of all the superior facul-
ties, namely, intellect and will. It often
happens that homosexuals of a sufficient
grade of vice are not able to judge re-
garding their obligations in marriage, which
are so contrary to their sexual orientation.
Homosexuals are nervous and in conflict
with themselves. Hence, there is a certain
distortion in the faculties of a man who is
11 Incapax est vir homosexualis iste propter de-
fectum discretionis iudicii, necnon propter in-
capacitatem assumendi onera coniugalia.
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afflicted with this disorder. They are, of
course, immature in their apprehension
and will and do not have, therefore, suffi-
cient discretion for the act of consent in
the marriage. Psychopaths, for Lefebvre,
even if they are not necessarily sick in a
strict sense, have such an evident dis-
turbance of their faculties, that they are
unable to freely determine themselves to
the object of marriage.
The testimony indicated that the respon-
dent was nervous, suffered from emotional
symptoms, such as depression, felt guilty,
came from a very strange family, and
always acted peculiarly. He was seen as
an abnormal person because of this bizarre
conduct. The experts, too, pointed out the
length of his homosexuality and its depth.
They thought his acting out was indepen-
dent of his will and somewhat uncon-
sciously caused. Summing up, Lefebvre
found a lack of discretion.
The second aspect of amentia for annul-
ling this marriage, according to Lefebvre,
was the incapacity of assuming conjugal
obligations. Homosexuals are so afflicted
by vice that they cannot give and receive
the ius in corpus, i.e., a perpetual and ex-
clusive ius in corpus for such acts suitable
for the procreation of children. They are
unable to give and receive these properties
of this consent, namely, its permanence
and exclusivity. No one is able to contract
for obligations that he is incapable of ful-
filling. The contract is invalid regarding
an object that is morally impossible, since
no one is obliged to the impossible. 12 He is
12 Iamvero patet neminem posse contrahere obli-
gationes quas incapax sit dotibus ipsis suis etsi
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incapable of contracting marriage, who is
morally incapable of assuming the vincu-
lur juris and its relative obligations of
justice perpetually and exclusively. This
incapacity results in the inexistence of the
object of the contract for those who abhor
the conjugal act so that it is impossible for
them morally to carry on. Those who are
not the lords of their own body cannot give
this over to someone else. In the case of a
homosexual, there is not the exclusion of
the object of marriage as in Canon 1086,
par. 2, but, rather, the defect of the object
in as far as the contractant is incapable of
giving and receiving the ius in corpus
which is required by the natural law. How-
ever, this moral impotence is not required
to be perpetual, since the object of the
contract is not in existence at the time of
the celebration of the contract.
Lefebvre then points to the facts in this
case to support his claim of the nullity of
this marriage. The respondent opposed
conjugal relations and stated that he mar-
ried for intellectual and friendly reasons,
lacked interest in children, experienced dif-
ficulties in consummating the marriage,
and did not have any interest in sex with
his wife. He left his wife's bedroom, he
said, to cure his insomnia. He claimed that
he was incapable of properly educating
children. Although he denied having sexual
relations with youths after the marriage,
the medical expert said that he had told
him otherwise. Several witnesses, of course,
pointed out the bad habits of the respon-
dent, his activities before the marriage
acquisitis adimplere. Doctrina tenet invalidum
esse contractum de obiecto relative impossibili,
cum ad impossibile nemo teneatur.
and after, and, of course, there was the
condemnation of him civilly and his being
remanded to jail for five years.
The experts referred to the gravity of
his homosexuality and the lack of hope of
curing him, and they pointed out the cir-
cumstances of his education and the vari-
ous stages of his homosexual activity
through the years. In any event, the sum
total of the acts points to the fact that his
homosexuality was so grave that he was
not able to give and receive the ius in cor-
pus perpetual and exclusive which is re-
quired by law.
This case was heard in second instance
by the Rota Coram Pompedda and a de-
cision given on the 6th of October, 1969.1;;
Now, it is interesting to note that Pom-
pedda reversed the first aspect of amentia
of this annulment; namely, that the respon-
dent lacked the discretion of judgment
necessary for marriage, but upheld the in-
validity of the marriage on the ground that
the respondent lacked the capacity for as-
suming the obligations of marriage. There
are two directions in homosexuality,
namely, the inclination towards persons of
the same sex, and the exclusion, or dislike,
or impotency towards persons of the op-
posite sex. Homosexuality is against not
only the biological end of marriage, but
even the psychological and social ends of
marriage, namely, the profound giving of
the parties to one another, their mutual
perfection of each other and enrichment
of the union of their spirits and the com-
pletion of their new life together in chil-
13 Il Diritto Ecclesiastico Vol. LXXX, II
(1969).
dren. Furthermore, marriage builds up the
family and society. Homosexuality, on the
other hand, is devoid of all of these bio-
logical, psychological and social functions.
Some people are so afflicted with homo-
sexuality, either by nature or habit, that
they are totally inept for marriage. In these
subjects, the will and the intellect so con-
spire toward one fixed object, persons of
the same sex, and the will so impelled to
fulfill feelings toward this object, that they
must be said to be incapable of undertak-
ing the obligations of marriage. We do not
have to look for a kind of imbecility or
intemperance of the will, but principally at
the total ordination of the person. One
must consider the total deordination of
the person in his most hidden heart of
hearts. But in each and every case, we must
look and see how the homosexual vice
really affects the matrimonial consent.14
In this case, even with all the facts as
we have them, there is not enough proof
that the respondent did not have before
his mind a sufficient view of marriage, nor
due deliberation in order that he might
come to a free choice of marriage. He may
have been irresponsible regarding his vices,
but not necessarily regarding marriage in
14 Attamen et alii exstant omosexuales, qui
sive ex natura sive ex habitu radicitus afficiuntur
vitio pessimo nec ab eo unquam averti poterunt,
quique ideo inepti omnino sunt ad matrimonium.
Hisce enim in subiecti sive intellectus sive volun-
tas simul conspirant in unum obiectum fixum
ac praevalens, adeo ut eiusmodi personae in-
capaces dici debeant ad matrimoniales obliga-
tiones suscipiendas. Nee igitur quapropter heic
spectanda dumtaxat sunt animi imbecillitas aut
intemperantia voluntatis, sed insuper ac potissi-
mum ac principaliter personae totius deordinatio
in suis abditissimis latebris pensare debet.
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this case. He put it off for some time, but
ultimately felt the marriage would cure
him. The immaturity that homosexuality
represents does not mean that a person
is immature in regard to his intellectual
functioning. While one may accept the fact
that homosexuality is psychosocial imma-
turity, it does not follow that a person is
immature in his intellectual functioning.
The respondent did have a conscience, as
he was affected by guilt throughout his
life. Hence, Pompedda concludes that one
cannot say that he lacked the knowledge
and the free choice in getting married,
even though he did make a mistake in
judgment in going against his inclination
in choosing marriage."
Regarding the second aspect of the basis
of amentia, Pompedda found that from the
evidence, the respondent had, without a
doubt, such a long-time and connatural,
(at least at the time of the marriage),
invincible inclination toward people of his
own sex, and such aversion and repugnance
toward women, that he was unable to
undertake the obligations of marriage. The
peritus in this case maintain that as a result
of his homosexuality he was so affected and
that it was a vice so consolidated by habit,
that with moral certitude he could maintain
the respondent, from a motive of homo-
sexuality and from its consequent implica-
tions, was incapable of assuming the obliga-
tions of his marriage. From the evidence in
15 Utcumque dici nequit in eo defiusse debitam
cognitionem et liberam electionem: eo vel ma-
xime quia ipse nuptias voluit contra suiipsius
radicatam ac veluti connaturalem inclinationem
oppositam. Eo sensu conventus haberi non po-
test sufficienti iudicii discretione carens in actu
contrahendi matrimonium.
HOMOSEXUALITY AND NULLITY
the case, Pompedda concludes that this is
true, that the respondent was an incapable
subject for the object of the marital con-
sent; hence, he was incapable of under-
taking the obligations of marriage.1 6
The results of this development of Rotal
jurisprudence, in my opinion, are the fol-
lowing. First, the Rota appears to be
getting away somewhat from legalisms. In
the New York case, for example, there is
a combining of two bases and the argu-
ments for them, into one case for nullity.
In the Montreal case, the ius in corpus
as the formal object of the contract of
marriage is expanded to the community
of life and love of Vatican II. One who is
unable to undertake that consortium vitae
is unable to marry. This opinion opens us
to a larger view of marriage, not only from
the natural law viewpoint, but in the con-
text of the civilization or culture in which
we exist. Certainly, when people speak of
marriage, they are not thinking of an ius in
corpus, but, rather, of living together their
common life with elements that are essen-
tial beyond what is expressed in the law.
We may look toward further development
of these essentials in marriage in facto esse.
The second over-all result of the Rotal
16 Quas conclusiones Patres accipiendas omnino
esse duxerunt sive propter scientiam qua prae-
laudati periti medici pollent, sive propter earun-
dem congruentiam cum cunctis causae actis, sive
propter cum factis certis ac probatis ipsarum
rationem. Vir igitur conventus, quidquid est de
sua erronea aestimatione circa aptitudinem ad
nuptias, idest circa sanationem ab habitu omo-
sexuali, ob suum statum incapax in contrahendo
fuit assumendi onera coniugalia, idest tradendi
alteri parti ius illud peculiarissimum quod con-
sensus matrimonialis obiectum esesentiale con-
stituit.
jurisprudence is that sexual deviation can
be an autonomous caput nullitatis. This
indicates that we no longer have need to
look for a lack of discretion on the part of
persons suffering personality disorder. Cer-
tainly, this view is more in keeping with
common sense, as the attempt to put every
amentia case under due discretion or lack
of sufficient knowledge and judgment,
seems to lead to a point where only an
elite can marry validly. St. Thomas, of
course, thought that ordinary business-type
judgment was sufficient for marriage.
Hence, there is no longer a need to stig-
matize homosexuals, unhappy as they are,
with a further mental disorder in order
to annul their marriages, nor a need to
try to prove that they are impotent in the
strict sense. However, there is a limitation
in these cases in the Rota, in that they deal
only with the extreme homosexual, or so-
called mono-sexual invert.
Thirdly, cases of sociopaths based on
inability to fulfill the object of the contract
should be easier to instruct, in that a his-
tory of antisocial behavior is easier to
produce than a history of mental illness.
The medical expert, too, can easier come
to his conclusion that the respondent is
incapable of marriage in facto esse, rather
than that he lacks discretion, i.e., affected
in judgment. A different approach must be
taken in instructing the case to prove the
respondent unable to undertake obliga-
tions.
Lastly, combining this new basis and
the new norms for the United States, a
Tribunal should be able to handle the case
of severe sexual deviation, and, perhaps,
of other personality disorders, more easily.
This Rotal jurisprudence and its devel-
opment, perhaps, indicates that we have no
real need for new impediments. New im-
pediments would have to be highly quali-
fied, as the impediment of impotence has
been, and this would somewhat limit fur-
ther development.
The ultimate conclusion of this whole
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paper, however, is this: we now have a
basis in jurisprudence for annulling the
marriages of homosexuals and other de-
viates. It is up to us to accept the cases,
to process them, and to bring them to a
proper conclusion in order to help people
who seek justice from the Tribunals of the
Church.
